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ARGUMENT1 
POINT 1 
The arguments set forth in the first point of Plaintiff Nyman's Brief are 
fully addressed and adequately answered by Points 1A and IB of Mr. 
McDonald's Brief in Chief (q.v.), and Mr. McDonald therefore foregoes further 
argument on this point. 
POINT 2 
PLAINTIFF FILED NOTICE CONCERNING ONLY MR. MCDONALD'S 
FAILURE TO MAKE MONTHLY PAYMENTS; PLAINTIFF'S LIST OF 
OTHER "NUMEROUS DEFAULTS" IS THUS IRRELEVANT. 
A. Erroneous Factual Assertions. 
Plaintiff's second point begins with a list of factual assertions, none of 
which are supported by reference to anything in the record. One of these 
declares that " [ i ] t is undisputed that the Appellant was in default on the 
payments . . . . The Appellee knew it, Draper Bank and Trust knew it, and the 
Appellant knew it." (Appellee's Brief at 21.) Nyman's accusatory tone here 
disingenuously presents Mr. McDonald in a false light. Mr. McDonald has never 
denied being in default; indeed, quite to the contrary, his good-faith attempt 
to cure his admitted default is central to the present dispute. 
1
 Mr. McDonald addresses each of Plaintiff Nyman's several points in the order 
in which they appear in Nyman's Brief. 
76437.MC 169.001 1 
Plaintiff Nyman later asserts that "[t]he Appellant admits not having paid 
the Appellee the extra monthly payment due in March, 1993, which was due 
within forty-five days of closing." (Appellee's Brief at 22.) Nyman is mistaken. 
The payments due on the properties in March, 1993, forty-five days after 
closing, were not "monthly payments"—extra or otherwise—regardless of 
whether Mr. Nyman labels them as such. The escrow agent denominates them 
"balloon payments," and differentiates them from the monthly "installment 
payments" required under the Notes. (See Appellant's Brief at 12 n.3.) 
B. Plaintiff's List of Mr. McDonald's "Numerous Defaults." 
After a brief recap of some of the covenants and provisions of "each and 
every All-Inclusive Trust Deed Note," none of which is at issue, Plaintiff 
enumerates four defaults, each of which he evidently believes independently 
justifies his foreclosure and sale of the four properties. (Appellee's Brief at 
22-24. ) 
/. Default No. 1. 
a. Balloon Payments. Plaintiff's discussion here begins with this 
declaration: "The evidence is undisputed that the Defendant was in fact in 
default under the terms and conditions of the four contracts as of July 12, 1993 
. . . ." (Appellee's Brief at 23.) Of course, this question-begging assertion asks 
the Court to accept as "undisputed" the central issue before it for 
decision—whether Mr. McDonald's July 12, 1993, payment cured the default on 
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the three properties—in essence, Plaintiff offers his conclusion as evidence of 
itself, and then presents the following argument in support: 
To counter this contention the Appellant claims that he brought all 
delinquent payments current with his payment of $6,900.00 official 
check and $345.00 cash payment on July 8, 1993. To come up 
with this conclusion, however, the Appellant has to assert that the 
payments due on the four properties on March 23, 1997 was not a 
monthly payment, but in fact was a "balloon payment" not subject 
to the Demand of Plaintiff to cure monthly payments; that there 
were no legal fees payable; and that there were no other breaches 
of the contracts. He further contends that without the "balloon 
payments" being added into the mix, the payment of $7,245.00 on 
July 12, 1993 brought all four contracts current. 
{Appellee's Brief at 23.)2 Mr. McDonald's actual claim is that his $7245.00 
payment cured the noticed defaults by satisfying the noticed delinquency. (See 
Appellant's Brief at 11-13.) As for labeling the balloon payments "balloon 
payments," Defendant simply uses the terminology of the escrow agent, Draper 
Bank and Trust (see, e.g., Affidavit of Sandy Steeneck, Record at 140 HH 4-6), 
which distinguishes the "balloon payment" from the "monthly installments." 
The nature of the default noticed by Plaintiff Nyman was "that [Mr. McDonald] 
ha[d] failed to make the monthly payments as provided in the Trust Deed Note" 
(Record at 800-08); the Notices of Default said nothing about the balloon 
payments, or any other charges payable. Relying on the representations of Ms. 
Wendy Smith, an employee of Draper Bank and Trust, who had informed him 
2
 As he is evidently wont to do, Plaintiff nowhere cites a single reference either in 
support or derivation. Defendant is dismayed to be thus forced to contend against wild 
assertions to buttress a conclusory declaration otherwise supported only by itself. 
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that $6900.00, plus $345.00 for late fees and expenses, would cure the default 
on the three noticed accounts, Mr. McDonald made a $7245.00 payment on July 
12, 1993. (Record at 706, 742-45, & 809-13.) 
Mr. McDonald does not contend that his July 12, 1993, payment of 
$7245.00 "brought all four contracts current," as Nyman claims (Appellee's 
Brief at 23), merely that "without the balloon payments, Mr. McDonald's July 
12, 1993, payment far exceeds the amount necessary to cure the three 
defaulted accounts." (Appellants Brief at 11). Plaintiff simply needs to do the 
math: the total amount due on the fourth property (124-128 West 1700 South, 
account no. 06661) was $3437.50. From this we subtract the amount already 
paid, $1100, for a total of $2337.50; then the noncollectible balloon payment, 
$550.00, for a total of $1787.50; less the balloon and July late fees, $55.00, 
for a final total of $1732.50. Added to the amount due under the other three 
contracts, $5349.50, the grand total is $7082.00, some $163.00 less than Mr. 
McDonald's actual $7245.00 payment. 
Additionally, Plaintiff's argument further ignores the credit entitled to 
Defendant for the rents actually collected by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has admitted that 
he collected rents in, at least, April and again in September, 1993. Properly 
crediting these amounts results in an overwhelming conclusion that Defendant 
fully cured the defaults. 
b. Allocation of Funds. Plaintiff next contends that 
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Defendant has no evidence, other than parol evidence3 that he 
instructed Wendy Smith on July 12, 1993 to cure the defaults with 
his $7,345.00 [sic] payment, there is insufficient evidence to show 
that her allocation of the funds among the four contracts was 
anything other than correct. 
{Appellee's Brief at 24.) Mr. McDonald, however, has been unable to locate the 
statute, case, or regulation upon which Plaintiff relies for this presumption of 
correct allocation on the part of an escrow agent. To the contrary, the scale of 
credibility tips well in favor of Mr. McDonald. 
Draper Bank and Trust has a firm policy against accepting partial 
payments. In fact, they returned a $1200.00 payment from Mr. McDonald 
because it was not a complete payment. (See Record at 734-36, 798-800.) 
If, as Plaintiff claims, Mr. McDonald's $7245.00 payment did not completely 
cover the defaults, why didn't Draper Bank and Trust return the money with a 
demand letter for the entire amount? Mr. McDonald has testified that Ms. 
Wendy Smith of Draper Bank and Trust informed him that $6900.00 would cure 
the default on the three properties for which Notices of Default had been filed. 
Wendy Smith has not testified otherwise; indeed, the only evidence offered by 
Plaintiff to contradict Mr. McDonald's sworn testimony is unsupported hearsay 
3
 "Parol evidence" (from the French parol "word"), of course, has long since ceased 
to mean simply oral evidence, as Plaintiff employs it; it has instead been for many years 
a specialized term generally reserved for contract disputes, and has to do with the 
introduction into evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements to clarify contractual 
ambiguities, West One Tmst Company v. Monison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
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offered by Plaintiff's counsel that "WENDY SMITH does not recall having told the 
Defendant any such thing." (Appellee's Brief at 25.) 
//'. Default No. 2. 
Plaintiff argues that Mr. McDonald was in default because he failed to 
"give[] any written notice to the Appellee providing confirmation of the 
placement of fire insurance on the four subject properties, despite a demand 
to do so by the Appellee in writing in April, 1993." (Appellee's Brief at 24.) Be 
that as it may, U.C.A. § 57-1-24(1) is quite specific that 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be exercised 
until: 
(1) The trustee first files for record . . . a notice of default. 
. . containing a statement that a breach of an obligation for which 
the trust property was conveyed as security has occurred, and 
setting forth the nature of that breach . . . . 
(emphasis added.) This alleged failure to secure fire insurance and provide 
written notice thereof to Plaintiff is neither mentioned nor referenced in the 
Notices of Default filed against the three properties by Plaintiff, and therefore 
cannot be cited as grounds for foreclosure. 
Furthermore, quite aside from the fact that Plaintiffs written demand is 
not, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute a breach of any obligation in the 
Deed of Trust, Mr. McDonald has testified that he did in fact purchase fire 
insurance on the properties, and provided notice of that fact to Mr. Nyman. 
(Record at 870.) 
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///. Default No. 3. 
In light of the fact that Mr. McDonald disputes Plaintiff's right to foreclose, 
and has in fact counterclaimed for wrongful foreclosure, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and breach of contract {Counterclaim, Record at 71-78), Plaintiff's 
adducing failure to pay costs, interest, and associated legal fees as a default 
seems a patent absurdity. (It can, in addition, hardly be a default to fail to pay 
the costs associated with a foreclosure, which must necessarily occur after the 
default.) 
In any case, however, this supposed default is not mentioned or 
referenced in the Notices of Default filed, and cannot therefore serve as 
grounds for foreclosure. 
iv. Default No. 4. 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that "Appellant has failed to reimburse the 
Appellee for his out-of-pockets [sic] costs incurred in maintaining the property 
while Appellant has been otherwise disposed of [sic] or has lost interest in the 
proeprty [sic]." (Appellee's Brief at 24.) Beyond this single assertion, this 
"default" is wholly unsupported; nevertheless, aside from the fact that Mr. 
McDonald recalls Plaintiff agreeing to do part of this work himself (Record at 705, 
737-41.), this "default," like the last two, is neither mentioned nor referenced 
in the filed Notices of Default and cannot be adduced as grounds for foreclosure 
under U.C.A. § 57-1-24(1). Further, paragraph 10 of the Purchase Agreement 
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between the parties required Plaintiff Nyman to be responsible for any 
deficiencies incurred while he owned the properties. The charges by the City 
and associated costs were all to correct deficiencies from when Plaintiff owned 
the properties. (Record at 726-27; 740-41.) 
POINT 3 
Plaintiff's next point consists of a rather obscure statement: 
While it is true that Draper Bank and Trust was Plaintiffs agent for 
the purposes receiving [sic] and disbursing funds from the 
Defendants was the Defendant's agent [sic]. In fact, the Defendant 
is the one who insisted upon u [sic] collecting and disbursing funds 
received from the Defendant, it is also true that Draper Bank sing 
[sic] an escrow agent, and he selected Draper Bank and Trust. If 
the Plaintiff is to be bound, then the Defendant must also be bound 
by the actions of the agent. The agent shows that Defendant never 
brought the accounts current by July 12, 1997 [sic]. 
(Appellee's Brief at 25.) Mr. McDonald is not entirely sure what this means, 
although it appears to have something to do with Plaintiffs first point—that the 
accounts were not current on July 12, 1993. Mr. McDonald's first point in reply, 
however, adequately addresses that argument; Point IC of Mr. McDonald's Brief 
in Chief (q.v.), in addition, examines those issues of agency which likewise 
seem to appear in the above paragraph. 
POINT 4 
THE FEES AND COSTS REQUIRED BY U.C.A. § 57-1-31(1) 
ARE COVERED BY MR. MCDONALD'S EXCESS PAYMENT. 
As has been demonstrated in Points 1A and IB of Mr. McDonald's Brief in 
Chief, Mr. McDonald paid $7245.00 in satisfaction of a default of $5349.50: a 
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difference of $1895.50. This amount should more than defray the fees and 
costs of Plaintiff's filing of Default Notices and appointment of Successor 
Trustee. The additional amounts collected directly by Plaintiff from the tenants 
also are adequate to cover these amounts. 
POINT 5 
THE DEFAULT NOTICES WERE DEFICIENT. 
A Notice of Default must "contain[] a statement that a breach of an 
obligation . . . has occurred, and set[] forth the nature of that breach."4 As Mr. 
McDonald pointed out in his Brief in Chief, the "breach" asserted in Mr. Nyman's 
Notices of Default—'Trustor has failed to make the monthly payments as 
provided in the Trust Deed Note"—is a tautological declaration that "Mr. 
McDonald was in default because he had defaulted." Nyman supports his 
question-begging declaration that "the requirements of Section 57-1-24(1), 
UCA have been satisfied" (Appellee's Brief at 28) with two paragraphs on debt 
acceleration and specification of amounts in default: 
. . . . since the default can be cured at any time within 90 days, it 
is generally not possible to describe exactly what is to be paid prior 
to termination of the ninety days at the outset of the filing of a 
Notice of Default, since amounts generally increase, and costs also 
increase. A person generally is expected to call the Appellee to find 
out what is necessary to bring all amounts current. . . . 
4
 Mr. McDonald agrees with Plaintiff that Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P.2d 717 (Utah 1982), is not convincing as to the requirements of a Notice of Default: 
the case has nothing to do with Notices of Default. Mr. McDonald cited Sutro in the 
context of dual-principal agency, which it admirably addresses. 
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(Appellee's Brief at 28.) 
This argument, however, makes no sense. Taken to is logical end, Mr. 
Nyman's assertion that "it is generally not possible to describe exactly what is 
to be paid prior to termination of the ninety days" would make it impossible to 
cure a default: at no point during the 90-day cure period would anyone be able 
to specify what amounts were necessary for cure, least of all the beneficiary of 
the trust deed, who might be able to list his or her out-of-pocket legal fees or 
costs, but more than likely would not generally have handy the specifics from 
the payment schedule held by the escrow agent trustee. Nor can the records 
of the escrow agent, to whom Mr. McDonald was contractually obligated to 
make payments, be preempted by Mr. Nyman's memory. 
Mr. Nyman also states that "each notice of default called for an 
acceleration of the remaining principal balance then due on each of the trust 
deed notes in the event the Appellant failed to cure the defaults within the 
ninety-day period." (Appellee's Brief at 28.) But debt acceleration, contrary to 
Mr. Nyman's assertions, does not apply here; Mr. McDonald did cure his default 
within 90 days of Notice, so the debt cannot be accelerated. Once again, Mr. 
Nyman argues in a circle, assuming a failure to cure—the very point at 
issue—and then declaring that the debt must be accelerated because of it. 
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POINT 6 
PLAINTIFF SLANDERED MR. MCDONALD'S TITLE. 
Plaintiff's brief ends with a misstatement of Mr. McDonald's position: 
The Appellant argues that title to his equitable estate in the 
properties was slandered by the Plaintiff by not having filed a 
Cancellation of Default as required by Section 57-1-31(1),(1985), 
UCA. The Appellant claims that the Plaintiff had an obligation to file 
a Cancellation of Default on the properties once Appellant made the 
payment to allegedly bring all the payments current on July 12, 
1993. 
{Appellee's Brief at 29.) Mr. McDonald, however, has argued no such thing; 
rather, he has simply pointed out that Plaintiff Nyman's posting and publishing 
Notices of Sale on the properties clearly gave a false and misleading 
impressions to the public as to Mr. McDonald's title. And directly telling renters 
to pay him rather than Mr. McDonald did the same. {See Appellant's Brief at 
19.) One need not demand Cancellation of Default in order to preclude such 
improper actions. 
And, indeed, U.C.A. § 57-1-31 nowhere requires a Cancellation of 
Default; it simply states that upon cure, "all proceedings theretofore had or 
instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and trust deed 
shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect the same as if no 
such acceleration had occurred." No duty to demand a Cancellation of Default 
is mentioned anywhere. In fact, such a duty would make a slander of title 
action impossible in a default situation: prior to cure, the statement that the 
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trustor was in default would be true, and hence nonactionable; after cure, 
assuming a duty in the trustor to demand a Cancellation of Default, the 
disparaging statement would become the trustor's fault, and hence 
nonactionable. 
U.C.A. § 57-1-31 requires no such demand by a trustor; to the contrary, 
U.C.A. § 57-1-31(1) simply requires the termination of all proceedings based 
on the default and returns all parties to the status quo ante. This status quo 
having been restored by Mr. McDonald's curative payment, Plaintiff Nyman's 
actions in posting and publishing of Notice of Sale slandered Mr. McDonald's 
title. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. McDonald reasserts that he made a good-faith effort to cure a default, 
the Notice of which stated that he was behind in his monthly payments. Having 
done so, he now finds himself embroiled in a lawsuit brought by a man who 
wrongfully collected rents which he did not apply to the monthly payments on 
the properties as required under the Trust Deeds; who Noticed Default on the 
properties due to inability to make monthly payments as a direct result of his 
own wrongful collection of rents and expenses incurred from repairing 
deficiencies in the properties which were present at the time he owned them; 
who filed insufficient Notice of Default, stating only that the monthly payments 
had not been made, and now denies that they were brought current; and who 
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now insists that various failings which he has heretofore neglected to mention 
ought to satisfy the statutory foreclosure requirements without having ever 
bothered to Notice them. 
For these reasons, as set forth above, Defendant R. Daryl McDonald 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision below. 
DATED this £)- day of January, 1998, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
£$*~*JZZT 
Jay R.' Mohlman~ 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
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